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limitations in conversion actions, since in many such actions there
is necessarily present an affirmative act of concealment on the
defendant's part which would give rise to equitable estoppel. It
must be pointed out, however, that the plaintiff must not be guilty
of negligence in failing to discover his cause of action, since this
will vitiate the plea of equitable estoppel.
ARTICLE 3-

JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANcE AND CHOICE

OF COURT
CPLR 302(a)(1): May be applicable to non-commercial transactions of business.
There seems to be a conflict as to whether CPLR 302(a) (1)
is applicable to non-commercial as well as to commercial transactions
of business. In Willis v. Willis,6 the supreme court, New York
County, held that a separation agreement entered into in New
York was not a "transaction of business" within the meaning of
CPLR 302 (a) (1).
The court7 said that this section encompassed
only "commercial" transactions.
However, the supreme court, Nassau County, in Todd v.
Todd,8 while holding service under CPLR 308 invalid, nevertheless
noted that there "may well be a basis for maintaining the action
in New York, for the separation agreement was apparently entered
into in New York ..
," 9
To resolve this conflict, a clarification by the Court of Appeals
is needed. In view of the recent amendment to CPLR 302(a) (3)
expanding jurisdiction in the area of tortious activity, it would
appear that the legislature intended CPLR 302 to approach the
constitutional limit. Therefore, it would seem most likely that
the Court of Appeals will eventually construe "transaction of
business" to include both commercial and non-commercial transactions. By so doing, the New York courts will be given as
broad a jurisdiction as is possible under the present terms of CPLR
302(a) (1).
CPLR 308(3):

Court warns plaintiffs about "sewer service."

In Todd v. Todd,10 the supreme court has warned plaintiffs
to exercise care in their choice of process servers. In that case,
the court vacated substituted service and dismissed the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction, since it was conclusively demonstrated that
I 42 Misc. 2d 473, 248 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Sup. Ct N.Y. County 1964).
7 Id. at 475, 248 N.Y.S.2d at 262.
8 51 Misc. 2d 94, 272 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct Nassau County 1966).
9 Id. at 96, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
10 51 Misc. 2d 94, 272 N.Y.S.2d 455 (Sup. Ct Nassau County 1966).
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the defendant did not reside at the address at the time that the
plaintiff's process server swore he made substituted service. The
court also refused plaintiff's application for a nunc pro tunc order
pursuant to CPLR 308(4), stating that even though the plaintiff
had no knowledge of the process server's perjury, this did not
excuse the wholly unauthorized act of "nailing and mailing" the
summons and complaint to a place where the defendant did not in
fact reside. The court went on to stress its strong disapproval of
this practice:
[Pirocess servers should be discouraged from sewer service, and
attorneys from employing process servers who cannot be trusted to
perform the acts they swear they do by refusing to accord any significance
to acts performed by them without the factual basis which the law
requires.1 1
The practitioner would be wise to heed the court's warning in
view of the fact that should service be subsequently vacated, the
statute of limitations may have expired.
CPLR 308(3): Substituted service vacated.
In Todd v. Todd,12 substituted service under CPLR 308(3)
was vacated where it was conclusively shown that defendant did
not reside at the address where the process server swore service had
been made.
The court, however, noted that the plaintiff might be able to
seek authorization to examine defendant's present attorney concerning defendant's address. Then, if the defendant's address could
not be obtained in this fashion, the court indicated that plaintiff
would have a basis for a 308(4) order authorizing service on
the attorney, "for there dearly is contact between defendant and
his attorney and service on the attorney will conform to the requirements of due process."' 3
4
This would seem to be in accord with Winterstein v. Pollard,"
wherein the court did not allow substituted service under 308(4)
on the defendant's insurer since there was no showing of an
actual contact between the defendant and the insurer. The court
in Winterstein stated that "it cannot be said that notice to the
insurer is reasonably calculated to give notice to the defendant." 15
In the present case, there would seem to be three possibilities
of service: (1) if the plaintiff fails to secure an examination of

"Id. at 95, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 456. (Emphasis added.)

Misc. 2d 94, 272 N.Y.S2d 455 (Sup. Ct Nassau County 1966).
Is Id.at 96, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
1450 Misc. 2d 354, 270 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct Nassau County 1966).
Is Id. at 355, 270 N.Y.S,2d at 527.
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